The University of Southern Mississippi

The Aquila Digital Community
Faculty Publications

Spring 2009

Candles in the Wind: Resisting Repression in
Liberia (1979-2003)
Robert Press
University of Southern Mississippi, bob.press@usm.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Political Science Commons
Recommended Citation
Press, R. (2009). Candles in the Wind: Resisting Repression in Liberia (1979-2003). Africa Today, 55(3), 3-22.
Available at: https://aquila.usm.edu/fac_pubs/15460

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by
an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more information, please contact Joshua.Cromwell@usm.edu.

Candles in the Wind: Resisting

Repression in Liberia (1979-2003)
Robert M. Press

Scholars have been extending social-movement analysis
beyond its base in the industrialized West to Latin America

and Asia, but rarely to Africa. Social movements resisting
repression in nondemocratic settings have usually had the
help of external "opportunities" or favorable circumstances.
This study, however, examines a peaceful social movement
in Liberia, a movement that resisted repression under two
regimes, advocating for human rights and democratic free
dom without such "opportunities. " How did this happenl The
study finds four explanations: the formation of a microsocial

movement with no formal leadership and only loosely con
nected strands of resistance, which were harder to control-, a
high level of commitment by participants; the skillful use of
local media and international organizations to put pressure
on the regime; and historical roots of resistance, especially
in the 1970s.

Introduction
Liberian human-rights attorney Tiawan Gongloe had little idea that people
in his country were paying attention to legal challenges to Charles Taylor's
regime until April of 2002, when he was seized by police. A large crowd of

angry Liberians gathered outside the police station to protest, and partici
pants refused to leave, even after many arrests had been made. That evening,

three security agents started a nightlong torture session of Gongloe: they
repeatedly forced him to squat (an action that damaged his ligaments), and
beat his body, injuring his kidneys. The torture, which also involved pour
ing hot candlewax over him, continued until 9 o'clock the next morning.
Unable to walk or stand in court, he was taken by ambulance to a hospital,
where, again, crowds of sympathizers gathered, despite the presence of
security forces and soldiers. Liberians were not the only ones to protest his
treatment: the U.S. State Department and numerous private human-rights
organizations issued statements calling for his release. He was soon freed.
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From 1979 to 2003 in Liberia, a period that included fourteen years of
civil war and a reign of terror under two presidents, democracy advocates
and human-rights activists1 managed to mount a small but public and peace
ful resistance, one that fits categorization as a social movement.2 Students,
lawyers, journalists, academics, members of the clergy, and others, joined
at times by the general public in demonstrations, mounted a serious public

P campaign using a variety of tactics (including marches, vigils, speeches,
?2. published statements, and lawsuits), calling for respect for basic rights, such

p as the right to assemble peaceably, not to be imprisoned without trial, not
o to be mistreated, and to express opinions and report the news. They did so
5 with few of the exogenous political opportunities often associated with the
JS emergence of social movements. The puzzle then is this: in the absence
of such advantages, how did a peaceful social movement (or resistance3
movement) take root and survive under two extremely harsh regimes?
_ This study suggests alternative explanations to political opportunity:

n formation of a microsocial movment that offered not only a smaller target to
z a repressive regime, but a more fluid one, with no formal leadership or mem
E bership; a high degree of commitment by most participants, driven more out
2 of desperation and a sense of purpose than by material incentives,- activists'

x access to the local media and to international human-rights organizations
^ and interested members of the diplomatic community that helped publicize
o abuses and bring international pressure to stop them; and historical roots of
resistance politics, especially in the 1970s.
Strands of resistance in such a movement are directed toward the

regime, though the strands are not always united. The strands help keep
demands for human rights and democratic freedoms in the public?and
international?eye, and they may win concessions if the regime is trying to
maintain the fa?ade of rule by law and seeks international aid.
In the world of Monrovia, the capital, where most of the resistance
took place, activists and advocates, though often acting independently of
each other, were known to each other and linked by friendships, family ties,
and professional pursuits; and acts of resistance became known quickly. The
resistance in this period, starting with the Rice Riots of 1979 and ending with
the end of the civil war in 2003, built on historical precedents of opposition
politics dating well back into Liberian history, including by the independent

press (Burrowes 2004) and students. It drew inspiration from individuals
such as Albert Porte, a stubbornly courageous and consistent critic of several
regimes. It drew from the experience of several key political organizations

formed in the 1970s and their leaders, as well as a growing independence
within some segements of civil society in the 1970s (Sawyer 2006).

Methodology
This study is based primarily on approximately fifty interviews conducted by
the author, most of them in Monrovia in 2006, and on archival and literature
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reviews. The study period (1979-2003) begins with a public demonstration
over planned government increases in the price of rice and ends with the
resignation of Charles Taylor as President of Liberia. The periods of the
repressive regimes that comprise the heart of the study are those of Sameuel

Doe (1980-1990) and Taylor (1997-2003).
The interviews were with many surviving key Liberian activists from

the study period who were still residing in Liberia, plus other knowledge- P
able observers. (Some activists had been killed; others had left the country.) ?3.
Interviews lasted typically from one to several hours. In a few cases, a second p

interview was conducted to follow up on unanswered questions. The inter- o

views were semistructured, using prepared themes to pursue but allowing JJ

the interviewee ample room to suggest points not always anticipated by S
the interviewer. A snowball method4 was used to locate appropriate activ- ^

ists and nonactivist analysts in both countries: starting with well-known

activists, the author sought suggestions from interviewees and others. Their suggestions were supplemented by archival research that pointed to others. ^
Many potentially useful archives of newspapers and the Roman Catho- S
lie Church, a leader in human-rights reporting in the 1990s, were destroyed 3
during the civil war through fires, forced closures, or vandalism. Since this

study contrasts with the more frequent identification of political opportu- S
nity as a major element in the explanation of social movements (an element ^
also included in recent studies of peaceful resistance by social movements
in repressive settings), it can be described as a "nonconforming" case study,
to use the terminology of sociologist and political scientist Charles C. Ragin

(2004:135-138), who frequently publishes on methodology.5 The study is
replicable and falsifiable. Most of the individuals interviewed are still alive
and can be located. Future researchers may look at the same evidence and
come to different conclusions.

Theoretical Perspectives
Political opportunity is a concept that one prominent social-movement
scholar has called "Western-saturated" (Tilly 2007).6 It has usually been
described in terms of exogenous elements, not agency. Piven and Cloward,
for example, argued that "protest movements are shaped by institutional
conditions, and not by the purposive efforts of leaders and organizers"
(1977:37). Tarrow argued that "contentious politics is produced when politi
cal opportunities broaden, when they demonstrate the potential for alliances,
and when they reveal the opponents' vulnerability"; he added, "the concept
of political opportunity emphasizes resources external [emphasis in original]

to the group" (Tarrow 1998:23, 20).
Political-opportunity theory has come to occupy a major place in the
study of social movements. Since 1973, when the term was introduced by
Eisinger, a "fairly strong consensus has emerged among scholars that move
ment development generally involves political opportunities and constraints,
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along with the forms of organization and the processes that link opportunity

and action (McAdam 2004:203).7 A general assumption has developed that
as "opportunity expands, actions mount; as opportunities contract, action
recedes. So the model suggests, but the reality is rather more complex. . . .
[There has been] a repeated empirical finding in many situations, even after

controlling for other factors, [that] increased repression leads to increased

P protest mobilization and action" ( Golds tone and Tilly 2001:180-181, empha
?2. sis original). "[Repression, rather than demobilizing a movement, actually

p contributes to its mobilization" (Schock 2005:42).

O A growing number of studies are using social-movement theories to

5 analyze cases of people resisting repression outside the democratic, indus
S trialized nations. Examples include Loveman (1998) on Chile, Uruguay, and
" Argentina,- Brockett (1991, 2005) on Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua,
Eckstein (2001) on Latin America; Boudreau (2001) on the Philippines; Bou

- dreau (2004) on Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia,- and Almeida (2008)

n on El Salvador. In authoritarian settings, a rich body of literature makes clear
S that, except in the most extreme cases, repression is often met with citizen

? resistance. These studies frequently involve mass public demonstrations
2 against repressive regimes, as in Eastern Europe (e.g., Karklins and Petersen
? 1993; Kuran 1991; Lohmann 1994); in the Soviet Union (Bessinger 2002); in
^ Latin America (Eckstein 2001); or in Iran (Kurzman 2005).
? Examined closely, many of these studies have involved not only mas
sive public demonstrations, as in Eastern Europe while the Cold War was
ending, but political opportunities. Boudreau argues that a key to under
standing resistance in the Philippines was the "shifting external opportuni

ties and constraints" (2001:176). Brockett even argues that "there are good
reasons to believe that the opening and contraction of political opportunities
is more central to the mobilization and success of Third World contentious
movements than it is for those in the First World" (2005:20) because activists

need them more in a dangerous setting. The Liberian case, as the empiri
cal section below shows, involved neither clear political opportunities, nor
massive crowds: the explanation for its resistance movement lies elsewhere.
Often in political science, agency theories, while putting the emphasis

on individual and collective initiative, focus on rational and self-interest
explanations, though altruism is cited in some analyses. In Liberia, the costs
were so high, and protest was so dangerous, that self-interest logic is difficult

to apply across the board. Lichbach, in his classic Rebels' Dilemma, offers
a rational choice approach to resistance and dissent: "[Collective-action]
theories ... should be a principal guide for students of protests and rebellion"

(1995:343). He goes on to list the types of people whom he deems likely to
engage in public dissent, including "[ljawyers, journalists, and academics in
every society [who] provide a disproportionate number of dissidents," and
he argues that professionals dissent to enhance their reputation and possibly

their income (1995:43).
Between structural opportunities and agency, however, as ways to
help explain what happened in Liberia, agency trumps, though not the kind
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limited to self-interest. What Lichbach fails to explain is why some profes
sionals who become dissidents ?as happened in Liberia) engage in dangerous
public dissent while most do not. His explanation, though useful in the
"rationality of economics . . . remains too incomplete of a conception of
human motivation to adequately account for much contentious activity
occurring under conditions of high risk" (Brockett 2005:22). Would a lawyer

risk torture or her life to challenge a repressive regime?on the issue of &^
habeas corpus, for example?to enhance her reputation or to gain an extra ?2.
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Repression
Founded by liberated slaves from the southern United States, Liberia declared

independence in 1847. For more than 130 years, until 1980, its politics was
dominated by descendants of the original settlers, known as Americo
Liberians (Clapham 1995:528).9 Tensions between the settler regimes and
the indigenous population led to periodic clashes, especially over taxation
policies, and to indigenous people's awareness of their deprivation (Gongloe
2006).10 President William Tolbert (1971-1980) encouraged some political
openness, but with vacillation. Several civil-society organizations advocat
ing mostly economic reform started in the 1970s, including the Movement
for Justice in Africa (MOJA), whose original leadership included Togba-Na
Tipoteh, Amos Sawyer, and H. Boima Fahnbulleh, Jr. The other major organi
zation, the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), led by G. Baccus Matthews,
organized in 1979 a rare and historically important public demonstration
(popularly known as the Rice Riots) against the government to challenge
plans to raise the market price of rice; it was put down with violence.11 "The
19th century-created polity was built on a foundation of social inequality. Its
evolution challenged that inequality and culminated at least in the 1970s
in a new discernable reform agenda. The 1980s emasculated that agenda.
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Warlordism in the 1990s and beyond destroyed what lingered on about that

agenda. . ." (Dunn 2008).
In 1980, when Doe seized power in a military coup, he became the
first indigenous head of state, but he soon frustrated many by replacing the
Americo-Liberian political hegemony in Liberia with hegemony of his ethnic

group, the Krahn, a minority of less than five percent (Nelson 1985:89). A
P 1986 report by Bill Berkeley for the New York-based Lawyers Committee for
?2. Human Rights reveals severe repression under Doe, including bizarre, hor
p rible acts against prisoners. In the aftermath of an attempted coup in 1985

O against him, an orgy of violence ensued. One witness saw soldiers "cutting
^ out people's eyes, even though they were already dead/; (Nelson 1985:52).
S A witness from atop a building along a road saw military "truckloads of
" bodies" passing by. Even from the time Doe seized power in a coup in 1980,
summary killings became a "recurring feature" of the new regime; flogging

- became "commonplace" with the use of "automobile fan belts, rubber whips
n cut from steel-belted radial tires, and long switches." Soldiers sometimes
i sprinkled sand and salt water on the backs of detainees to increase the pain
? (Nelson 1985:7). In 1984, after students had demonstrated against the arrest
^ of political opposition leaders, including Dr. Amos Sawyer (who later became
S an interim President of Liberia), on fake charges of plotting to overthrow the

^ government, Doe's soldiers invaded the University of Liberia, raping many
? female students and killing some students (Berkeley 1986:40-44).
University students, faculty, journalists, lawyers, and clergy were
among the targets of the Liberian government's repression?the very groups

from which emerged a small band of courageous activists who continued
challenging the Doe and Taylor regimes on human rights and democratic
freedoms, sometimes even after they had been detained, tortured, and
released. Key activists were among the most frequent targets of flogging and

detention under deplorable conditions. Among those detained under Doe
were Alaric Tokpa and Ezekiel Pajibo, interviewed as part of this study.12
Pajibo, detained in December 1985, was at one point tied to a rubber tree
and subjected to a mock execution when questioned by the military about
the activities of Sawyer (Berkeley 1986:163). Conditions in detention were
"abysmal: gross over-crowding, poor ventilation, and primitive sanitation
facilities." With no screens, prisoners were subjected to the onslaught of
malaria-carrying mosquitoes (Berkeley 1986:82).
Charles Taylor, who had fought as a rebel leader from late 1989 to
1997, headed a brutal regime as president from 1997 to 2003; some activists

rated the repression worse than under Doe. Human Rights Watch provided
this assessment (2003):
After five years in office, President Taylor's government con
tinued to function without accountability, exacerbating the

divisions and resentments fueled by the civil war. Taylor
continued to consolidate and centralize power by rewarding
loyalists and intimidating critics. State power continued to be
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misused by high-ranking officials to further the political objec

tives of the executive branch, to avoid accountability, and for
personal enrichment. State institutions that could provide an
independent check on the Taylor administration, such as the
judiciary, the legislature, and the human rights commission,
remained weak and cowed. Independent voices in the media
and the human rights community were steadily silenced. ^
O

Examining Political-Opportunity Explanations
^
o

One way to examine the extent to which op
the Liberian resistance is to use what McAd
critical external structural conditions favo

movements, including "wars, industrialization, i

ments, prolonged [economic woes], and w
(1982:176, 2004:213).13

War. There was civil war in Liberia
fro
m

2003. It added to the feeling of a need for
increased danger to any resistance effort
ing large-scale activism or protests, the f
spurred most activists and others to seek

peace movement, which involved marches an
of the war.14

Industrialization. There was no significa
during this period.15

International political alignments. Durin

international political realignment affected m

Cold War, in 1989. This ensuing peace grad
focus on human-rights abuses abroad, wh
cal opportunity for advocates of human ri

toward Liberia was ambivalent. Having suppo
the rigged election of 1985, the United State
in Liberia, even when civilians were faced wi

During the interim administrations betw
Taylor (1990-1997), one of the civilian pre
policy toward Liberia vague (Sawyer 2006):

There was some effort to promote or sup
but I think ultimately the desire [of the U
a stable country superseded other consid
the Taylor [rebel] years, the first years of
schizophrenic?very ambivalent position.
figuring out where the United States was

Prolonged economic problems. There we

for the average Liberian during the study pe
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have a dampening effect on a potential resistance movement, leaving those
with any income unwilling to risk losing it. The movement did not become
a massive one, primarily because of the danger.
Widespread demographic changes. Liberia experienced a massive move
ment of displaced Liberians fleeing the civil war, as refugees or internally
displaced, mostly in Monrovia. The United Nations High Commission for
P Refugees estimated that more than 850,000 people fled to neighboring coun
ts. tries. Another one million, roughly one-third of the country's population,
p became internal refugees. From 1974 to 1999, the proportion of the Liberian

o population living in urban areas grew from 29 percent to 46 percent (Afri
5 can Women and Peace Support Group 2004:4, 6), but this did not appear to
S increase the number of key participants in the movement, which remained
^ fairly small; nor does it seem to have provided new leadership for it.
~3~ Thus, none of the political opportunities cited by McAdam and others

- were present or produced the expected results. This suggests there were
n alternative explanations. An argument of this study is that social-movement

?
?
2
S
?
?

participants in authoritarian regimes may be forced to operate essentially
without supporting, exogenous political opportunities, creating their own
opportunities. Kurzman (1996, 2005) comes to a similar conclusion in his
study of activists in Iran. Potential activists may find themselves with a
choice of waiting for better opportunities while continuing to witness (or
endure) repression by the state, or moving ahead despite the risks.
This study does not argue that activists in Liberia proceeded with
no benefits from external events or conditions (opportunities). There were
some. International human-rights organizations, for example, publicized
abuses in an attempt to win the release of jailed activists and bring pressure
on the regimes to stop the killings and protect human rights.16 The presence

of a regional peacekeeping force and, later, United Nations troops provided
a semblance of security, especially in the capital, where most of the peace
ful resistance to the regimes took place, but even such apparent advantages
provided little comfort to those in the resistance. Taylor's security forces
when he was president continued to detain and mistreat suspected oppo
nents of the regime, despite the presence of international troops,- and while
international publicity helped with the release of some leading activists and
may have prevented the arrest of others, abuses of the rule of law against
thousands of others continued: some key activists were forced into hiding
or exile, and others were arrested.
No claim is made that advocacy and activism were directly responsible
for the demise of presidents Doe and Taylor. Doe was assassinated at the
hands of a splinter rebel group in 1990. Taylor's resignation, in 2003, involved
pressure from rival rebel movements and an international indictment for war
crimes,17 but activism helped make the rule of law, democracy, and human
rights in Liberia major public issues, domestically and abroad. While making
no causal explanations or predictions that such movements lead to regime
change, it is worth noting that Liberians in 2005 elected Africa's first woman
president, on a platform that featured human rights and democratic rule.
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Examining Alternative Explanations for Resistance

Historical roots of resistance. The political resistance from 1979 onward, as
noted above, had its roots in early resistance by the press, students, pam
phleteer Porte (supported in a rare public rally in 1975 when facing criminal
charges), the labor movement, and organizations formed in the 1970s.
Coming out of the 1970s, you had, for example, the formation

of independent unions breaking away from the government
sponsored unions. . . . Many shop stewards decided to speak
on their own. You had the Chamber of Commerce [becoming
more active]. You had a number of women's groups spinning

off. . . . Independent schools flourished [and you had] the
revival of the student union, ... let alone the agitation of PAL
to organize a political party of itself. . . . These were examples
not just of a handful of people screaming from a street corner,

but widespread movements. The Liberian Council of churches
was very, very active. (Sawyer 2006)

Microresistance movement. Despite the lack of political opportunities
(as seen above), some Liberian lawyers, journalists, clergy, leaders of some
nongovernment organizations, students, teachers, opposition politicians,
and others, mounted a microresistance campaign in the 1980s, one that
grew in the 1990s and continued until Taylor's resignation.18 The movement
included lawsuits, critical published reports, clerical condemnations, strikes,
and protest marches. Its goals were democracy, human rights, and peace. At
times, activists mobilized people for a mass demonstration,- but for the most

part, resistance was small-scale, only loosely coordinated at best, without
formal leadership, involving individuals and organizations. A larger profile,

a more centralized or connected social movement, would have provided an
easier target under regimes that frequently used violence to suppress dissent.

As it was, many activist leaders were arrested; some were tortured; many
more were forced into hiding in the country,- some fled into exile.

Limited but dangerous and open resistance to the Doe regime began
almost immediately after the coup in the form of public statements, and crit

ical journalistic reporting condemned by the government and several mass
demonstrations organized by university students. The Liberian National
Student Union helped organize a rally of thousands of students less than a
month after Doe assumed power, calling on the military to return to their
barracks (Wesseh 2006). Former student leader Tokpa recalled a pattern in
such student resistance. Political opponents of the regime "would make
radical statements against the regime. They would be arrested and put in
jail and then their imprisonment would provoke a social anger, which would

lead to mass demonstrations [by students and their supporters]"; the gov
ernment repression led to underground pamphleteering by student activists

(Tokpa 2006).
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Many political organizations were banned under Doe except in the
weeks immediately before the 1985 elections, leaving campus student
organizations and the press among the few viable sources of resistance to
increasingly authoritarian and harsh rule. Resistance grew after the 1985
sham election, but it was limited by repression.19 "It was difficult because
we were hunted by Doe; I had to hide," recalls one outspoken member of

P the clergy, Bishop Arthur Kulah (2006).
?2. Journalist Kenneth Best, editor of the Daily Observer, frequently ran
p afoul of the government with his well-researched articles that gave voice to
o dissent and exposed the regime's economic shortcomings. In retaliation, his
5 press was shut down five times, he was jailed several times, and the regime's
?5 thugs set his newspaper offices on fire three times (Best 2006). Other newspa
* pers experienced similar reprisals for persistent publication of articles critical

~Z~ of the government. Doe forced the closure of independent newspapers in
- 1990 as rebel forces led by Charles Taylor were closing in on the capital. By
n July 1990, "there was not a single independent media house in Monrovia,"
z according to Gabriel Williams, a leader in the Press Union of Liberia. The
? Press Union, along with transportation organizations, teachers, women's
2 groups, and others, organized an unusual mass public march to call for Doe's
3 resignation in mid-1990. Thousands of people, ranging from professionals to
? market women, converged toward the president's mansion. "Everybody was

i dancing, singing_There was this chant, 'Monkey, Come Down'" (Williams
2006).20 Doe's security forces broke up the demonstration with force.

The period 1990-1997 saw the partial collapse of the state as rebels
controlled all but Monrovia. This situation provided an opportunity for
human-rights organizations to start, including the Justice and Peace Com
mission (JPC), formed by the Roman Catholic Church in 1990. The JPC used
a network of informants during the civil war to report abuses; these reports

in turn were aired on the church's radio outlets and forwarded to human

rights organizations abroad, putting Taylor under international scrutiny.
"Human rights activism was delivering body blows to Taylor's political
machine as their activities de-legitimized the regime on a daily basis" (Dunn
2006).21 During Taylor's rule as president, several other key human-rights
organizations formed. Individual lawyers working in loose coordination
attempted to represent and defend arrested activists, some of whom were
being tortured by state security agents. Clergy and students continued to
speak out against the regime, and the independent press frequently aired
critical reports that brought government reprisals.

Liberia's peaceful resistance can be categorized (table 1) in terms of
chronological periods, the background of the advocates or activists, their
tactics, and their goals.22 As impressive as the acts of resistance were, resis

tance remained small and microsocial; to present a larger, more vulnerable
target, especially in the early stages, was too risky. For the most part, the

movement involved a small number of individuals, particularly lawyers,
journalists, student leaders, and clergy, drawn to the resistance through
their professions or academic status. Organizations were involved at various
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Table 1.
Peaceful Resistance in Liberia: Activists, Tactics, and Goals: 1979-2003

Years: President Activists_Tactics_Goals_
1979-1980: Tolbert Opposition Articles, speeches, Regime reforms,
politicians, students demonstration democratization
(1979)

1980-1985: Doe Opposition politi- Demonstrations, Regime reforms,

cians, students, articles democratization

I??

O

journalists

1985-1990: Doe Journalists, wider Articles, speeches, Human rights,

civil society demonstrations international

en

& community
awareness

1990-1997: interim Clergy, journalists, Legal defense, International &.
governments wider civil society articles, broadcasts, community

workshops awareness, peace

1997-2003: Taylor Attorneys, clergy, Articles, broadcasts, Human rights,
journalists, wider legal defense, boy- regime change,
civil society, women cotts, demonstra- international

tions, strikes community

awareness, peace

Sources: interviews in Liberia in 2006 by the author and archival research.

times, but they tended to be weak and underfunded, with little in the way of

material resources, unable to provide substantial help or support to activist
members. The professional lawyers' organization, for example, went through
long periods of noninvolvement with political actions, only periodically
becoming more active, depending on who was chair. Coordination among
human-rights lawyers tended to be informal, rather than organizational, so
as to avoid detection,- but there was communication through networking.
One activist recalls: "In the 1980s, there were no cell phones in Liberia.
[People depended on] word of mouth. Most of these meetings were secret,
informal, or on the phone. We'd meet at social gatherings." By 1997, when
Taylor began his repression, human-rights organizations had started in the
quieter period of interim governments, 1990-1997. Communications were
easier with the introduction of cell phones and e-mail (Bility 2006).
Mass demonstrations tended to be one-time events, not part of a
planned program of resistance. Some were spontaneous, like the show of
support for arrested and tortured activist attorney Gongloe, described at the
opening of this article. Though people were intimidated by the brutality
of the Doe and Taylor regimes, neither head of state could prevent such an
unplanned, unorganized show of sympathy?a clear expression of criticism
of their regimes. Other demonstrations were planned.
There was no defined leadership of the movement, no umbrella orga
nization coordinating resistance.23 There was a shifting cast of activists,
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including students, journalists and, especially in the 1990s, lawyers and
clergy. All of this made it harder for Doe and Taylor to stop the resistance.
The arrest of a particular activist would trigger a response by others. (Exam

ples of this are included in the section below on media and international

contacts.)
Commitment. That there was a resistance movement at all speaks

P to the stubborn commitment and determination of people who insisted on
2- principles such as the rule of law, human rights, democratic freedoms, and
p respect for human dignity. Participants risked arrest, torture, or death. Both

o "personal conviction and passion have driven the [resistance] process," says
^ Kofi Woods, a leading activist and the first head of the JPC. At several par
S ticularly tense periods in the struggle, Woods was forced to keep changing
^ homes where he slept, accommodated by sympathizers (Woods 2006).24
~ZT Some advocates for these rights and democratic freedoms sought politi

- cal advantage for themselves, but they, too, faced the risks of repression when
n they spoke out.25 "Ours was an effort to insure respect for the rule of law,

z to develop democratic polity, and to have greater inclusion in the political
? process," said one leading advocate for democratic freedoms, whose nongov
2 ernment organization office was attacked by Taylor's thugs (Sawyer 2006).26
x The Most Reverend Michael Kpakala Francis, Roman Catholic Arch
g bishop of Monrovia, was one of the most courageous vocal critics of both Doe

? and Taylor. Some Liberians were self-identified as human-rights activists

and worked primarily as individuals, staying in touch with other activists
informally. These included attorneys such as Woods, Gongloe, and others,
including Aloysius Toe, who worked with private organizations. Woods and
Gongloe focused on legal challenges to the abuses of human rights, initially
operating on their own at a time when the professional bar association was
reluctant to become involved in political protest. Gongloe said his own activ
ism had a long-range goal: "to help a lot of people who were in difficulty,
as a way of building a larger coalition for the promotion and protection of

human rights" (Gongloe 2006).
Some attorneys, such as Dempster Brown, Tokpa, and Augustine
Toe, were drawn into activist roles that took up an increasing amount of
their professional time. A few attorneys represented victims of the regimes
starting as early as the mid-1980s, and later helped launch organizations to

expand such work.
Using media and international contacts. In the face of severe repres
sion, activists of the Doe years and the larger number under Taylor publicized

abuses by making use of local media and their contacts with international
human-rights organizations and diplomatic representatives. Activist journal

ist and Press Union of Liberia leader Williams recalls how his organization
"mobilized the population" for the mass demonstration in 1990 to call on
Doe to resign: "We publicized it on the radio, in the newspaper, calling on the
public to say: this is the time of national decision" (Williams 2006). Earlier,
reporting by Liberian journalists and activists had informed a highly critical

1986 report by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, cited above, as
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well as numerous reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
and other groups. It led to United Nations sanctions on resources that Taylor
had plundered to help finance the civil war. Ultimately, in 2003, documented

abuses culminated in an international indictment for war crimes against

Taylor.
Though data are lacking to document many events of regime repres
sion or resistance, two examples of resistance in the later part of the Taylor P
years indicate democratic advocates and activists' skillful use of media and ?2.
international pressure. The first example involves the arrest, in 2002, of jour- p
nalist Hassan Bility, who had continued writing articles critical of the Taylor o
government and was later charged with treason. When he was arrested, activ- ^

ist attorney Aloysius Toe took up his case, but Toe was arrested too. Then S

other attorneys took up the case. The government began moving Bility from "
one location to another, but the attorneys, tipped off by government insiders, ~z~

kept denouncing the government in the local press, communicating with the American Embassy, and keeping international human-rights organizations x
informed. A local human-rights group organized a march to the executive S
mansion (Taylor's presidential office); its leaders, including attorney Brown, 5
were arrested. Those arrests triggered further responses. Archbishop Francis,

widely described by former activists as an outstanding advocate for justice S
during the Doe and Taylor regimes, was traveling in Europe at the time. As ^
President of the Liberian Council of Churches, he called President Taylor
to complain. "The Director of Police told me he received over 12 calls from
7 a.m. to the next day," recalls Brown, who was soon released. Bility, after
being tortured, was released within a few months. Brown said in an interview
(Brown 2006):27
[Taylor] took the human rights groups for granted; but later on,

he came to realize [the impact of] human-rights groups because

we sit and talk to Amnesty International, talk to Human
Rights Watch, and we used to network on Mr. Taylor's activi
ties. We monitored him on disappearance of peaceful citizens
and all the things that were happening here.

Another example of using the media and international contacts came in 2002

in protests against the mass arrests of Mandingos, an ethnic group Taylor
suspected of aiding rebels against him. Aloysius Toe documented some of
the arrests and passed the information to various international human
rights organizations. He described what he did next as "tacit bargaining,"
which resembles a chess game in which both sides respond to the moves
of the other (Toe 2006). First, he filed writs of habeas corpus on behalf of
some of those arrested. When the government responded that the cases
would be tried in military courts, Toe, with the help of seven other Liberian
attorneys, filed writs in the military courts. He filed a complaint with the

African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in Banjul, The Gambia.
When the courts failed to respond, he organized a public prayer breakfast,
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inviting diplomats and many religious organizations. (A U.S. diplomat and
a local Moslem representative were among those who showed up.) He then
organized a peaceful protest march to the executive mansion to present a
petition to President Taylor. Before the march could be held, Toe received
a tip that he would be arrested, and he fled to Sierra Leone. He went into
hiding for eight days then turned himself in, refusing to flee the country as

P others had been forced to do. Later, during a rebel attack on Monrovia that

?2.
o

damaged the prison, he escaped,

H

O

> Conclusion

^ The concept of "political opportunities" continues to feature in

_3~~ ies of social movements in the democratic West, identified as ext

- cumstances or conditions that tend to favor a movement's progre
n social-movement analysis is applied to authoritarian cases (only

z to Africa, so far), such opportunities are similarly cited in recent s

S critical to resistance movements. This study concurs that such
^ ties help a movement, but how can a peaceful social movemen

x authoritarian rule survive when few, if any, such opportunities ar

? This case study of such a movement in Liberia between 1979 a
g period that includes heavy repression by two regimes, provides

explanations to the opportunity thesis: formation of a microsoc
ment with only loosely connected strands of resistance from civ
highly committed participants,- use of the media and international

tions to publicize abuses of power and bring international press
regime; and historic precedents of resistance, which became mor
in recent decades, especially the 1970s.

No claims are made that the activism caused the fall of

regimes. A militia leader murdered one of them, Samuel Doe,- t

one, Charles Taylor, resigned in the face of an international indictm

war crimes as rebel forces were approaching the capital: but acti

pressure on the regimes by making human rights and democratic fr
an issue in the eyes of citizens and the international community. Ad

for human rights and democracy were only loosely connected w

coordinated planning except for public demonstration, but linked by
and professional ties. Participants included university students, jour
academics, lawyers, some clergy, and others, often drawn into righ
cacy or activism through their profession and their ideals, as well (i

cases) as their political ambitions.

This study suggests that future research lies in probing the imp

activists and advocates on the two regimes and vice versa. It poin

need to explore further the limits of resistance (compared with rep
to determine which levels of repression effectively shut down a res

movement, possibly driving it underground or pushing it toward
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No single study can answer all questions about a nonviolent resistance

movement.

Finally, the very fact that a resistance movement was mounted despite

the risks and lack of opportunities not only extends our concepts of what
people in political social movements can do under oppressive conditions: it
extends our appreciation for the tenacity of human spirit.
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NOTES
1. The term human rights activist was not widely employed in Liberia during the 1980s. The
term more often employed was advocate. Former interim Liberian President Amos Sawyer
described himself, for example, as an advocate of democracy, not as a human-rights activist.

Others called themselves political activists or human-rights activists. But political scientist
Elwood Dunn, a Liberian, asks: "How do you draw the line between human rights and politi
cal activism?" He names Liberia's first female president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, as an example

of both.
2. Meyer defines a social movement as "collective and sustained efforts that challenge existing
or potential laws, policies, norms, or authorities making use of extrainstitutional as well as
institutional political tactics" (2007:10). Tilly includes in his definition of a social movement the
concept of a "campaign" using a "repertoire" of tactics and participants who are serious, unified,
committed, and sometimes capable of "filling streets" (2004:3-4). Building on these definitions,

but recognizing that repression can at times interrupt a "sustained" campaign of various tac
tics, and that individual activists can play an important role in maintaining momentum for a

collective response, I use as a definition of a social movement or resistance movement against

an authoritarian regime a "process" (Foweraker 1995:23) of public challenges to a regime's
abuse of power that may involve individual as well as organizational activism, and at times
mass public support, and is aimed at either regime reform or regime change.
3. In this study, I use the terms social movement and resistance movement interchangeably.
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4. The snowball method of interviewing invo

other appropriate persons to interview on t

initial circle of contacts. It worked, but I ha

since the men tended to name mostly men.

5. Press (2006) examined Kenya's peaceful resis
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study aims to extend his findings in a more

civil war only a few years earlier (2003). The

under two repressive regimes during the wa

6. Previously known more often as political o

given way to "apparently more fluid concep

and Jasper 2004:4).

7. McAdam (1982) is generally credited with

which political opportunity is a main elemen

as an excessively structuralist approach in a

he has not been content with "the often

concepts often were applied, concepts he pr
D

argued for a more flexible approach, involv

processes (2004:225).

8. Francisco (2001 ) notes that Lichbach's selec

collective action; after a massacre, for examp
Z

a

such government repression.

9. For additional analyses and differing perspect

see Dunn and Tarr (1988); Liebenow (1969,19

Burrowes (2001 ) provide important document

more was needed on student activism, and h

torical resistance, Burrowes (2004), writing on

to defend freedom of the press and other

highlight the growing militancy of the Liberi

10. Tiawan Gongloe was a longtime human-r

administration of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, wh

11. Known as the "Rice Riots," this event is ju

resistance to repression of this period and i

Tolbert presidency, which was overthrown i

12. In separate interviews, Tokpa, Pajibo, and
their activism.

13. McAdam repeated the same list from 1982

be given to cultural issues and international

14. The author will analyze the peace moveme

15. Liberia, however, as part of the global econo

which affected its rubber and iron-ore indu

Sawyer (1979) note a growing militancy dur

and organized labor.

16. Doe sought recognition and aid from the

of 1985, he released some activists just befo

sought Western support, but engaged in pe

presidency.
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17. The indictment by a special court in Sierra Leone focused on his war crimes and alleged role in
fomenting a civil war in that country as part of his strategy for power in Liberia. Apprehended

as he tried to escape from exile in Nigeria, Taylor was soon transferred from Sierra Leone to
the International Criminal Court at The Hague, the Netherlands.

18. In the capital, starting around 1990, with a civil war engulfing the rest of the country, "the

process of advocacy assumed a more institutionalized dimension, for the first time, where
institutions were being organized, including the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission ...
and several other groups that came on later,"according to activist attorney Kofi Woods (2006),

who became a minister in President Ellen Johnson-Sirleafs administration.

Ht

I?'

O

19. Doe claimed victory with 50.1 percent ofthe vote, though exit polls indicated Jackson Doe
(no relation) won. The U.S. State Department certified the election as "free and fair" (Moran
2006:120). The election was "thoroughly fraudulent," and the U.S. certification ofthe results
"effectively shut off the last possibility of evicting Doe from power by constitutional means,

or at least by peaceful ones" (Ellis 1999:63).
20. The chant "Monkey, Come Down" was a call for President Doe to resign.
21. Dr. Dunn, a professor of political science at the University of the South in the United States,
served in the federal government of his native Liberia from 1974 to 1980.

22. Many other diasporal Liberians wrote articles, testified before Congress, and sought interna
tional actions against Doe and Taylor.Their activities, though important, are beyond the scope
ofthe current study, as is the role of international donors during the Doe and Taylor regimes.

30

m
en

23. Two exceptions regarding their own particular activities were the Press Union of Liberia, active

from the 1980s, and the Liberian Coalition of Human Rights Defenders, formed in 2000, by
which time the Taylor regime was under threat from rebel groups seeking to depose him.

24. Woods and Gongloe are winners of an international human-rights award from a private
corporation.
25. For reasons of space, this study does not attempt to present a full argument against the self
interest or rational-choice explanations of Lichbach (1995), Olson (1965), and others.

26. Sawyer and Conmany Wesseh were viciously assaulted but survived the attack.Taylor appar
ently was frustrated by the fact that international delegations frequently would stop by their

office, where Sawyer said he gave them a quite different appraisal ofthe government and its
record from the one they had received from Taylor and his staff. Wesseh assumes the motive
for the attack lay in a lingering distrust ofthe reform advocates ofthe 1970s, most notably the

leaders ofthe Movement for Justice in Africa, as well as former student leaders like himself

(Wesseh 2006).
27. Brown helped start the Center for the Protection of Human Rights in 2000, partially to help
win court release of detainees not granted speedy trials.
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